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THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY AS AFFECTED BY
STANDING, ANTENUPTIAL CONCEPTION, AND
THE LORD MANSFIELD RULE
Plaintiff brought a bastardy action against defendant seeking to have
him declared the putative father of her child and therefore liable for its
support. The only testimony was a deposition by the plaintiff, a formerly
married woman, stating that prior to her marriage she had intimate rela-
tions exclusively with the defendant and at the time of her marriage to
another man she was pregnant and her future husband knew of it. The
husband then had the marriage annulled and subsequently the child
whose legitimacy was in question was born. The trial court granted de-
fendant's motion for a summary judgment stating that plaintiff was not
an unmarried woman under the statute' and therefore the child is con-
clusively presumed legitimate. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held, reversed and remanded: The plaintiff, because of
her annulment, is an unmarried woman and therefore has standing to sue.
The presumption of legitimacy is rebuttable, not conclusive, the plain-
tiff's testimony can come in to rebut the presumption (dictum). B.S.B.
v. B.S.F., 217 So.2d 599 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
The importance of the court's decision is threefold. First, a Florida
court has, for the first time, reversed the heretofore uniform interpreta-
tion of Florida Statute section 742.0112 and has given a formerly married
woman (whose child was legally presumed conceived in wedlock) stand-
ing to sue in a bastardy proceeding. Prior to this decision the Florida
courts have consistently interpreted this statute to mean that any mother
whose child was conceived in wedlock, whether she was currently married
at the time she brought the suit or not, had no standing to sue in bastardy
proceedings.'
This rule of standing was created by a strange misinterpretation of
case law. In the case of Gossett v. Ullendorff,4 a sordid and distasteful
probate fight occurred when a mother tried to bastardize her children by
her own testimony. The court, with justified repulsion, said in ruling
against the mother:
Circumstances seem to us to be more analogous to that condi-
tion in which through public policy a wife is not permitted to
deny the parentage of children born during wedlock. She cannot
repudiate their legitimacy. That right belongs only to the father
1. FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (1967).
2. The exact words of the statute are:
Any unmarried woman who shall be pregnant or delivered of a bastard child, may
bring proceedings in the circuit court, in chancery, to determine the paternity of such
child.
3. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So.2d 163 (1944); Kennelly v. Davis, 216
So.2d 795 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), aff'd, 221 So.2d 415 (1969) ; Illgen v. Carter, 123 So.2d 368
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1960) ; Sanders v. Yancy, 122 So.2d 202 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
4. 114 Fla. 159, 154 So. 177 (1934).
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because maternity is never uncertain. She may only contest the
identity of the child.,
What the court had clearly been alluding to was the Lord Mansfield
Rule which prevents the testimony of the parents from bastardizing the
child. Subsequent case law, however, resulted in a gross misunderstanding
which developed into another "bastard rule." The case of Eldridge v.
Eldridge6 interpreted Gossett as creating a rule of standing whereby
Florida will allow only the father or putative father, but not the mother,
the right to contest a child's legitimacy when the child is born in wedlock.
This construction was completely unwarranted, for with the exception
of Louisiana7 there is no local or foreign precedent restricting standing
to either party because of sex. On the contrary, the general rule is that
either party could contest legitimacy. Since the Eldridge decision all
subsequent Florida cases dealing with this question have adopted its
interpretation.9
In the instant case the court failed to spell out the reasoning behind
its decision on the standing question.1" This leaves the holding open to
various interpretations. The two most likely are (1) that the court gave
a literal interpretation to the word "unmarried," i.e., the plaintiff only
need be unmarried at the time the suit is brought rather than at the time
the child was conceived;" or (2) the court in rejecting the Lord Mans-
field Rule not only accepted the wife's testimony to rebut the presump-
tion of legitimacy but also to show that the child was conceived out of
wedlock, thus giving the mother standing to sue. Whatever the reason
for the court's decision on the standing question, the court proceeded to
rule on the substantive issues in the case-the presumption of legitimacy
and the Lord Mansfield Rule.
The conclusive presumption of legitimacy was brought into the
English common law from a maxim of Roman Law. 2 However, since it
was a conclusive presumption, it wrought absurd results during the early
5. Id. at 169, 154 So. at 181 (emphasis added).
6. 153 Fla. 873, 16 So.2d 163 (1944).
7. Louisiana, under civil law, has a similar rule. It probably arose because of the
emphasis given by Lord Mansfield when he said "especially the mother who is the offending
party." See note 49 infra. Eloi v. Mader, 1 Rob. 581 (Va. 1841) ; Succession of Barth, 178
La. 847, 152 So. 547 (1934).
8. Wright v. Hicks, 15 Ga. 160 (1854). However, many states by statutory authority
have limited the right of a woman to bring suit in bastardy proceedings on the basis of
whether she was married or not. See Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 256 (1964).
9. Kennelly v. Davis, 216 So.2d 795 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), aff'd, 221 So.2d 415 (Fla.
1969) ; Illgen v. Carter, 123 So.2d 368 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960) ; Sanders v. Yancy, 122 So.2d
202 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
10. The court simply referred to Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 256, 262-64 (1964).
11. This is the more likely reason, since the annotation to which the court referred
mentions a similar Kansas statute in which the state court construed "unmarried" to refer
to the mother's status at the time the suit was brought. Blush v. State, 4 Kan. App. 145, 46
P. 185 (1896) ; Willets v. Jeffries, 5 Kan. 470 (1870).
12. Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its Legal Effect and
Its Questionable Constitutionality, 35 S. CAL. L. Rav. 437 (1962).
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English common law period. 13 Gradually two classic exceptions evolved
-physical absence for so long a period before birth as to make it a
natural impossibility that the husband could be the father, and im-
potency. 4 This resulted in the presumption becoming rebuttable rather
than conclusive upon the proof of nonaccess or impotency. 5 Further
attempts to bring the presumption in step with reality resulted in ex-
pansion of the circumstances upon which a case of nonaccess could be
established."
The next major development of the presumption of legitimacy was
its application to cases where a child was conceived prior to the mar-
riage of its parents but born in wedlock.' 7 In Rex v. Luffel8 the court, in
extending the presumption to antenuptial conception, explained that the
child would be legitimate regardless of how many days or months after
the marriage the child is born, subject, however, to bastardization by
proof of impotency or nonaccess. The court went on to say that the
presumption's application to antenuptial conception is a carryover from
civil law, and its purpose is to establish the parentage of the child. 9 In
the same vein, a court in a later English case pointedly exclaimed that
13. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 398-99 (2d ed.
1898). An example of the absurdity that resulted when the presumption was conclusive is
the story of St. Hugh of Lincoln. A knight who was away three years returned and found
his wife had given birth to a child the day before he returned. The court, evoking the
presumption, held that the child was legitimate, saying the privities of husband and wife are
not to be known to others. Id.
14. Comment, note 12 supra. This was the famous doctrine of "within the four seas,"
according to which the child was conclusively presumed legitimate no matter how long the
parents were apart as long as both parents were within the four seas of England, i.e., within
the King's jurisdiction. For a complete historical survey see F. PoLLocK & F. MAITLAND note
13, supra.
15. Pendrell v. Pendrell, 2 Strange 925, 93 Eng. Rep. 945 (1732).
16. Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beav. 552, 50 Eng. Rep. 457 (1846). The court, in modify-
ing the strict requirement of non-access that only proof of natural impossibility could rebut
the presumption, states:
A child born in wedlock is, in the first instance, presumed to be legitimate. The
presumption thus established by law is not to be rebutted by circumstances which
only create doubt and suspicion, but it may be wholly rebutted by showing that the
husband was first, incompetent; secondly, entirely absent, so as to have no inter-
course or communication of any kind with the mother; thirdly, entirely absent
at the period during which the child must, in the course of nature, have been be-
gotten; fourth, only present under such circumstances as afford clear and satis-
factory proof that there was no sexual intercourse. Id. at 555, 50 Eng. Rep. 458.
17. Rex v. Luffe, 8 East 198, 103 Eng. Rep. 316 (1807); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 23
Beav. 273, 53 Eng. Rep. 167 (1856).
18. 8 East 198, 103 Eng. Rep. 316 (1807).
19. In discussing the rationale for the extension of the presumption to antenuptial con-
ception cases the court stated:
With respect to the case where the parents have married so recently before the
birth of the child that it could not have been begotten in wedlock, it stands on its
own peculiar grounds. The marriage of the parties is the criterion adopted by the
law, in the cases of antenuptial generation, for ascertaining the actual parentage of
the child. For this purpose it will not examine when the gestation began, looking
only to the recognition of it by the husband in the subsequent act of marriage. Id.
at 207, 103 Eng. Rep. at 321.
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the husband's reactions subsequent to the child's birth carry great weight
in determining whether the presumption has been rebutted. 20
The presumption soon moved across the Atlantic and was accepted,
without reservation by every jurisdiction in the United States.21 Some-
where along the way, however, a misnomer arose. Many courts continued
to apply the words "conclusive presumption" to the already evolved re-
buttable presumption.22 What occurred, in effect, was that the courts said
that the presumption was conclusive, subject, however, to certain excep-
tions; namely, to the same proof of circumstances of nonaccess and
impotency that rebutted the presumption in England.28
It is sometimes contended that the presumption actually was con-
clusive in some jurisdictions, but upon close inspection of many of the
"leading" cases it appears that such statements were (1) dicta,24 (2)
applicable when the husband had knowledge of the wife's pregnancy
prior to the marriage,25 or (3) simply an example of using the word
"conclusive" too loosely.26 The overwhelming majority of cases, however,
expressly recognized the presumption as rebuttable.27
20. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 23 Beav. 273, 53 Eng. Rep. 167 (1856).
21. Stegall v. Stegall, 22 F. Cas. 1226 (No. 13351) (U.S. 1825) ; Kennedy v. State, 117
Ark. 113, 173 S.W. 842 (1915); Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So.2d 163 (1944);
Zachmann v. Zachmann, 201 Ill. 380, 66 N.E. 256 (1903) ; In re Osborn's Estates, 185 Iowa
1307, 168 N.W. 288 (1918); Goss v. Froman, 89 Ky. 318, 12 S.W. 387 (1889); Hubert v.
Clouatier, 135 Me. 230, 194 A. 303 (1937) ; Scanlon v. Walske, 81 Md. 118, 31 A. 498 (1896) ;
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 605 (1862) ; Rabeke v. Baer, 115 Mich. 328, 73
N.W. 242 (1897); Rhyne v. Hoffman, 59 N.C. 385 (1862).
The following jurisdictions no longer follow the common law rule of the presumption
of legitimacy, but have incorporated the rule into statutory form and follow it as such: CAL.
CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1963-31 (Deering 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 3012 (1966); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 61-101 (1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-01 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 10.1 (1966) ; WISC. STAT. ANN. § 328.39 (1958).
22. Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114 N.W. 527 (1908) ; State v. Romaine, 58 Iowa
48, 11 N.W. 721 (1882) ; State v. E.A.H., 246 Minn. 299, 75 N.W.2d 195 (1956); Hudson v.
Hudson, 151 Neb. 210, 36 N.W.2d 851 (1949); State v. Herman, 35 N.C. 337, 13 Ired. Law
502 (1852).
23. See note 22 supra.
24. Rhyne v. Hoffman, 59 N.C. 335 (1862); State v. Herman, 35 N.C. 337, 13 Ired.
Law 502 (1852). In both cases the court said that when a man marries an obviously pregnant
woman and the child is born in wedlock it is conclusively presumed to be his on the theory
that by his subsequent act of marriage he is acknowledging the child as his; but in both
cases the court found that the wives were not obviously pregnant, and thus the presump-
tion was rebuttable. But see West v. Redmond 171 N.C. 742, 88 SE. 341 (1916).
25. State v. Shoemaker, 62 Iowa 343, 17 N.W. 589 (1883); Hudson v. Hudson, 151
Neb. 210, 36 N.W.2d 851 (1949) (premarital sex, as well as knowledge of future wife's
pregnancy) ; Miller v. Anderson, 43 Ohio St. 473, 3 N.E. 605 (1885). Contra, Roth v. Roth,
21 Ohio St. 646 (1871).
26. State v. Romaine, 58 Iowa 48, 11 N.W. 721 (1882); State v. E.A.H., 246 Minn.
299, 75 N.W.2d 193 (1956).
27. Stegall v. Stegall, 22 F. Cas. 1226 (No. 13351) (U.S. 1825) ; Eldridge v. Eldridge,
153 Fla. 873, 16 So.2d 163 (1944) ; Zachmann v. Zachmann, 201 Ill. 380, 66 N.E. 256 (1903);
Phillips v. State, 82 Ind. App. 356, 145 N.E. 895 (1925); Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37,
114 N.W. 527 (1908) ; Clark v. State, 208 Md. 316, 118 A.2d 366 (1955). For a more complete
listing of all jurisdictions, see Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 729 (1958).
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The American courts, like the English courts, were soon applying
the presumption of legitimacy to cases of antenuptial conception.2" The
rationale most often given for the application of the presumption to this
area was, again, to establish the parentage of the child so that the child
would have a name as well as support, thus saving the public this expense.
A second reason was to protect the family unit if possible.2"
In applying the presumption to cases of antenuptial conception,
the overwhelming majority of cases held that the presumption was in no
way weakened." The small minority of cases holding the other way, i.e.,
that when the presumption is applied to antenuptial cases it is weakened
and less proof is needed to rebut it,31 were generally based on the spurious
reasoning that there was a greater likelihood that anyone could be the
father.3 2
Since the adoption of the presumption in antenuptial and post-
nuptial situations in America there has been an expansion, beyond non-
access and impotency, of the type of evidence that can be used to rebut
the presumption. Today courts have accepted the following types of
evidence: (1) conduct of the parents at the child's birth; 33 (2) physical
characteristics of the legal and putative father; 34 (3) scientific proof; 5
and (4) competent testimony bearing upon the question. 6
28. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 146 Ark. 45, 225 S.W. 22 (1920); In re Ruff's Estate, 159 Fla.
777, 32 So.2d 840 (1947) ; Zachmann v. Zachmann, 201 Ill. 380, 66 N.E. 256 (1903) ; In re
Osborn's Estate, 185 Iowa 1307, 168 N.W. 288 (1918) ; Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114
N.W. 527 (1908); Clark v. State, 208 Md. 316, 118 A.2d 366 (1955); Dennison v. Page, 29
Pa. 420 (1857).
29. He is deprived of all of the benefits of a father and the legal right to support
from him, leaving that responsibility to the mother, who is usually less able to pro-
vide for him. This and other important factors, including the preservation of the
integrity of the family unit and harmony within it, provide the strongest considera-
tions for favoring legitimacy and for discouraging litigation in such matters except
in the clearest cases. For these reasons the presumption still remains one of the
strongest known to the law.
Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d 163, 165, 340 P.2d 761, 763 (1959).
30. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 146 Ark. 45, 225 S.W. 22 (1920) ; Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla.
873, 16 So.2d 163 (1944) ; Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114 N.W. 527 (1908) ; Stone v.
Stone, 193 Okla. 458, 145 P.2d 212 (1944) ; Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. 420 (1857) ; Moore v.
Moore, 299 S.W. 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
31. Wright v. Hicks, 15 Ga. 160, (1854); Coury v. Felix, 276 Minn. 125, 149 N.W.2d
92 (1967) ; In re McDermott's Estate, 125 Neb. 179, 249 N.W. 555 (1933) ; Wilson v. Babb,
18 S.C. 59 (1882); Jackson v. Thorton, 133 Tenn. 36, 179 S.W. 384 (1915). In this latter
case, the court clearly spelled out why it considered antenuptial conception as weakening the
presumption.
Some of the courts hold that the presumption in such cases must arise from the
fact of the marriage and not from the sexual intercourse assumed to result from the
marriage, and that the presumption of legitimate birth is therefore so far
weakened that it may be overcome by a lesser weight of evidence. Id. at 38, 179
S.W. at 384.
32. Wright v. Hicks, 15 Ga. 160 (1854).
33. Id.
34. Stillie v. Stillie, 119 Kan. 816, 244 P. 844 (1925).
35. State v. E. A. H., 246 Minn. 299, 75 N.W.2d 195 (1956).
36. Pursley v. Hisch, 119 Ind. App. 232, 85 N.E.2d 270 (1949); In re Findley's Estate
253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930).
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Another factor affecting the presumption as applied in antenuptial
situations is the husband's knowledge of his wife's pregnancy prior to or
at the time of marriage. It has already been mentioned that certain juris-
dictions consider that knowledge of the pregnancy by the husband makes
the presumption conclusive.37 This was reiterated again in State v. Shoe-
maker,8 where the court held that
[a] husband who in the manner we have indicated has put him-
self in loco parentis of a bastard child of his wife ought not be
permitted to disturb the family relationship and bring scandal
upon his wife and her child, by establishing its bastardy after
he condoned the wife's offense by taking her in marriage.39
The majority of cases, however, seem to agree that despite the husband
having knowledge of his wife's pregnancy, the presumption is still rebut-
table albeit more difficult to rebut.4 ° Correspondingly, ignorance of the
future wife's pregnancy shown by proof or by subsequent acts of the
father has been held enough to rebut the presumption.4'
Another interesting factor applicable to antenuptial conception is
that there is no time limit on the number of months or days prior to birth
(when the prior conception must have occurred) for the presumption to
attach, as long as the child is born in wedlock.42 This raises problems
when, as in the instant case of B.S.F., the conception is prior to the
marriage but the birth is after the annulment. The general rule appears
to be that the marital status continues for sometime afterward,43 but
there are no cases on point where the conception is antenuptial and the
birth post marital. There are, however, many cases where separated or
divorced wives have given birth to children within a reasonable time
after the divorce or separation, and the children have been presumed legit-
imate.44 The two Florida cases45 dealing with antenuptial conception
have established that the presumption, despite being "one of the strongest
known to law," is rebuttable, and that antenuptial conception in no way
37. See note 25 supra.
38. 62 Iowa 343, 344, 17 N.W. 589, 590 (1883).
39. Id.
40. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So.2d 163 (1944); Wallace v. Wallace, 137
Iowa 37, 114 N.W. 721 (1882); Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. 420 (1857). See notes 27 and 30
supra.
41. Wright v. Hicks, 15 Ga. 160 (1854); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen)
605 (1862).
42. Stegall v. Stegall, 22 F. Cas. 1226 (No. 3351) (U.S. 1825) (6 months); Zachmann
v. Zachmann, 201 Ill. 380, 66 N.E. 256 (1903) (15 days) ; Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37,
114 N.W. 527 (1908) (4 months); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 605 (1862) (5
months) ; Phillips v. Allen, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 453 (1861) (8 months) ; Dennison v. Page, 29
Pa. 420 (1857) (3 months).
43. In re Julian's Estate, 189 Kan. 94, 333 P.2d 432 (1959) ; People v. Bedell, 342 Mich.
398, 72 N.W.2d 808 (1955).
44. Balance v. Balance, 261 Ala. 97, 72 So.2d 851 (1954); State v. Bowman, 230 N.C.
203, 52 S.E.2d 345 (1949); Plato v. Plato, 205 Misc. 497, 132 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1954); Smith v. Smith, 71 S.D. 305, 24 N.W.2d 8 (1945).
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weakens the application of the presumption."0 It may be assumed that
Florida follows the established trend as it relates to all aspects of the
rebuttable presumption of legitimacy. Therefore, non-Florida cases up-
holding legitimacy where there is antenuptial conception and prenatal
divorce would indicate that the annulment prior to the birth in B.S.F.
is irrelevant to the presumption of legitimacy.
There is still a third issue involved in the principal case; the re-
nunciation of the Lord Mansfield Rule, by dictum, so as to allow either
parent to testify as to their child's legitimacy.47 The rule, stated simply,
is that neither parent may testify to information that would bastardize
their children. The rule was established and derived its name from the
famous case of Goodright v. Moss,4 wherein the eminent jurist, Lord
Mansfield, denounced the right of either parent to bastardize their child
based on the grounds of "decency, morality and public policy."49 His-
torically, however, Lord Mansfield misconstrued precedent because prior
to his rule parents were allowed to testify and bastardize their children."
There were some major cases prior to his pronouncement that refused
to allow the "uncorroborated" testimony of parents to bastardize the
child by rebutting the presumption of legitimacy,5' but Lord Mansfield's
statements were more than a step forward; they embodied a brand new
rule. The fact that there was no historical precedent to support his state-
ment forms one of the major arguments by those who favor abolishing
the rule.52
The rule, despite its creation after the Declaration of Indepen-
dence,53 was soon widely adopted throughout America and applied to
both parents in any type of legal situation where a child could be
45. In re Ruff's Estate, 159 Fla. 777, 32 So.2d 840 (1947) ; Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla.
873, 16 So.2d 163 (1944).
46. See note 45 supra.
47. B. S. B. v. B. S. F., 217 So.2d 599 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
48. 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
49. The famous quote in full is:
As to the time of birth the father and mother are the most proper witnesses to prove
it. But, it is a rule founded in decency, morality and policy that they shall not be
permitted to say, after marriage, that they have had no connection and therefore
that their offspring is spurious; more especially the mother who is the offending
party. Id. at 594, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1258.
50. 3 R.C.L. Bastards § 6 (1929).
51. Rex v. Rook, 1 Wils. 340, 95 Eng. Rep. 651 (1752); Rex. v. Bedel, Cas. T. Har.
379, 95 Eng. Rep. 245 (1737).
52. Dean Wigmore is the greatest antagonist towards Lord Mansfield's rule, and one of
the strong points of his attack is the historical mistake Lord Mansfield made in assuming
precedent was on his side.
The story of the rule that parents may not bastardize their issue is a .singular
one, though it has had some parallels in other parts of our law. First, a settled
rule then a chance judicial expression, in apparent contradiction, then a series of
rulings based on a misunderstanding of this expression and an ignoring of the settled
rule; then an entirely new rule, and new and wondrous reasons contrived and put
forward to defend the novelty, as if it had from the beginning been based on the
experience and wisdom of generations.
4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2064 at 387-88 (3d ed. 1940).
53. All English common law prior to the Declaration of Independence was adopted in
1776, but in this instance the case was accepted although it was decided in 1777.
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bastardized.54 This was true whether or not either parent was dead.5
The adoption of the rule, however, did not preclude bastardization of
the child; it simply prevented the husband and wife from doing so di-
rectly.50 The court, in implementing the rule, was actually excluding tes-
timony of either parent that could rebut the presumption of legitimacy,
i.e., any testimony tending to prove impotency or nonaccess. 57 Either
parent's testimony could come in, however, to prove issues other than
legitimacy of the child such as seduction' or adultery.59 The fact that
such sordid testimony can and often does come into evidence illustrates
the inaccuracy in Lord Mansfield's assumption that the rule would
promote decency and morality.6" A careful study of the rationale em-
ployed by the courts in the application of the rule seems to point to an
emphasis on concern for the child 1 and considerations of public policy.2
The rule, like the presumption of legitimacy, was extended with the same
potency to cases involving antenuptial conception."5
54. Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 173 S.W. 842 (1915) (mother's testimony in
bastardy proceedings excluded); Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514, 138 N.E. 6 (1922)
(husband's testimony in a probate case excluded); Scanlon v. Walske, 81 Md. 118, 31 A.
498 (1896) (wife's testimony in probate case was excluded) ; Rabeke v. Baer, 115 Mich. 328,
73 N.W. 242 (1897) (wife's testimony in seduction case excluded) ; Egbert v. Greenwalt, 44
Mich. 245, 6 N.W. 654 (1880) (both parents' testimony excluded in a criminal conversation
case) ; Palmer v. Palmer, 79 N.J.Eq. 496, 82 A. 358 (1912) (husband's testimony in an
annulment case excluded) ; Mink v. State, 60 Wis. 583, 19 N.W. 445 (1884) (wife's testimony
in bastardy case excluded). The English have also extended the rule to divorce cases. Russell
v. Russell, [1924] A.C. 687.
55. Rex v. Kea, 11 East 132, 103 Eng. Rep. 954 (1809). The reasoning given was that
the death of either parent is irrelevant in regard to the rule's application, since the purpose
of the rule is not to prevent family dissension but rather to help the child and the public.
56. Palmer v. Palmer, 79 N.J. Eq. 496, 82 A. 358 (1912). The court restricted the rule
only to "direct" testimony of either parent. "It does not prevent the admission of evidence
on the subject from other sources, but it does prevent the parties from stultifying them-
selves and committing fraud upon each other and upon their children." Id. at 498, 82 A. at
359.
57. See note 54 supra.
58. Rabeke v. Baer, 115 Mich. 328, 73 N.W. 242 (1897).
59. Kreighbaum v. Dinsmore, 88 Ind. App. 693, 165 N.E. 526 (1929); Koffman v. Koff-
man, 193 Mass. 593, 79 N.E. 780 (1907).
60. Dean Wigmore also mounts a strong attack against the rule on this point. His argu-
ment is reprinted and accepted in Lynch v. Rosenberger, 121 Kan. 601, 249 P. 682 (1926).
See Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937).
61. Tioga County v. South Creek Township, 75 Pa. 433 (1874). The court said the
reason for the rule was to prevent unseemly and scandalous testimony; not because it
reveals the parents immoral conduct, but because of the effect it may have on the children
who would suffer through no fault of their own.
That the parents should be permitted to bastardize the child is a proposition which
shocks our sense of right and decency and hence the rule of law which forbids it. Id.
at 437.
62. In re Wright, 237 Mich. 375, 211 N.W. 746 (1927).
[We think the rule is a good one on the ground of public policy. The Mansfield
rule undoubtedly lessens the number of public charges which would have to be cared
for and supported by the public. It works for peace and quiet of the family. It works
for the peace of the community and society generally and the state has passed
legislation which has advanced and supported these reasons all of which we appre-
hend may be construed as showing a public policy. Id. at 748-49.
63. Kreighbaum v. Dinsmore, 88 Ind. App. 693, 165 N.E. 526 (1929); Wallace v.
Wallace, 173 Iowa 37, 114 N.W. 527 (1908); People v. Bedell, 342 Mich. 398, 72 N.W.2d
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Despite this wide acceptance of the rule as previously indicated, it
has not gone unchallenged, and for good reason. A definite trend away
from the rule has grown, led by Dean Wigmore's objections on historical
as well as equitable grounds. 4 Some cases have reversed the rule simply
on the strength of Dean Wigmore's argument. 5 Others have abrogated
it on the grounds that it is contrary to common sense and the best ev-
idence rule." States have also overruled the rule by statutory construction
or interpretation.17 Still other courts simply make various exceptions to
the Lord Mansfield Rule but do not overrule it entirely. 8 The English
themselves appear to have restricted the operation of the rule in certain
circumstances on the basis that it causes an injustice to the husband. 9
Looking at the current case law that involves the rule, it becomes
obvious that it is still firmly entrenched in a majority of jurisdictions; 70
however, the slow process of overturning precedent is continuing.7 1 In
Peters v. District of Columbia,7 2 the court said that basic fairness and
logic is found in Dean Wigmore's position.
808 (1955); Yanoff v. Yanoff, 237 Mich. 383, 211 N.W. 735 (1927); State v. Herman, 35
N.C. 337, 13 Iled. Law 502 (1852); Tioga County v. South Creek Township, 75 Pa. 433
(1874) ; Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. 420 (1857).
64. See notes 52 and 60 supra.
65. See note 60 supra and Stillie v. Stillie, 119 Kan. 816, 244 P. 844 (1925). Both Kansas
cases, however, have been overruled by Martin v. Stillie, 129 Kan. 19, 281 P. 925 (1929).
66. Nolting v. Holt, 113 Kan. 495, 215 P. 281 (1923) ; Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383,
172 So. 316 (1932). The court was quite clear as to why it abrogated the rule:
The evidence here under consideration is relevant and comes from persons who
best know the truth of the matter under consideration, i.e., whether they had
opportunity for access to each other at the time the child was begotten. The exclu-
sion of this evidence therefore would obstruct and not facilitate the search for
truth. It should therefore be admitted unless its exclusion is clearly demanded by
some specific important extrinsic policy against which every intendment should be
made.
Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. at 389, 172 So. at 319. See also State v. Sargent, 100 N.H. 29,
118 A.2d 596 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
67. State v. Soyka, 181 Minn. 533, 233 N.W. 300 (1930) ; In re Wray, 93 Mont. 525, 19
P.2d 105 (1933); Louden v. Louden, 114 N.J. Eq. 242, 168 A. 840 (1937). For a full dis-
cussion and list of cases on this point, see Annot., 60 A.L.R. 390 (1929) ; Annot., 89 A.L.R.
912 (1934).
68. Nulman v. Cooper, 120 Colo. 98, 207 P.2d 814 (1949) (allowed wife's testimony
bastardizing the child because the husband had so testified in a previous action) ; People v.
Dile, 347 Ill. 23, 179 N.E. 93 (1931) (allowed wife but not husband to testify, on the
ground that husband would try to relieve himself of the burden to support the child and
the burden would then fall on the public); New York v. Nelson, 124 Misc. 800, 210 N.Y.
335 (1924) (held that a parent can testify to bastardize the child if cross examined by the
other parent).
69. Paulett Porrage Case, [1903] 1 A.C. 395, held that when a man marries a pregnant
women that is not visibly enceinte and he did not know of the pregnancy, the rule does not
apply to prevent fraud against the husband.
70. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968) ; State v. Wade, 264 N.C.
144, 141 S.E.2d 34 (1965) ; Leider v. Leider, 210 Pa. Super. 433, 233 A.2d 917 (1967);
Barr's Next of Kin v. Cherokee, Inc., 220 S.C. 447, 68 S.E.2d 440 (1951); Esparza v.
Esparza, 382 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
71. Vasquez v. Esquibel, 120 Colo. 98, 346 P.2d 293 (1959). Peters v. District of
Columbia, 84 A.2d 115 (D.C. 1951); Ventresco v. Bushey, 159 Me. 241, 191 A.2d 104
(1963).
72. 84 A.2d 115 (D.C. 1951).
CASES NOTED
For what avail would it be to open the front door of the court
to a woman and allow her to enter and lodge a complaint and
then at the critical point of the trial itself, seal her lips and
forbid her to tell the fundamental facts of the case. 3
What is perhaps the strongest indictment yet by a court against the
Lord Mansfield Rule is stated in the case of Ventresco v. Bushey:
7 4
We do not lightly cast aside a rule of evidence which has never
before been challenged by our court. But in the face of facts
such as are apparent in the instant case where blind adherence
to an illogical doctrine can result only in the "suppression of
the truth and the defeat of justice," we are constrained to re-
consider and abolish the rule. We now hold that both husband
and wife may testify both as to his nonaccess to her and as to
facts which tend to prove that access was impossible.75
Because of the previously discussed "bastard" rule of standing and
because of the fact that it is usually the wife who would bring suit to gain
support for her child, the Lord Mansfield Rule had never been tested in
any prior Florida case.
In the instant case, after the court proceeded through accident,
ignorance, or misconception to hopefully deal a deadly blow to the archaic
rule of standing, it overruled the Lord Mansfield Rule and held the pre-
sumption of legitimacy rebuttable. But instead of delineating the two
rules, the court, in apparent confusion, spoke as if there was but one
rule. In trying to place the presumption of legitimacy in its proper per-
spective within the twentieth century, the court not only held that the
presumption was rebuttable, as precedent had already established in
Florida, but also removed the presumption from its exalted position.76
To achieve this result the court, whether intentionally or not, reduced
the stringent requirements not only as to the degree of proof necessary
to rebut the presumption but also as to the type of evidence that could
be entered to rebut the presumption. The court either out of ignorance
or through a conscious but dimly defined progressive bent, then pro-
ceeded to include the wife's testimony bastardizing her child as competent
testimony, thereby overruling Lord Mansfield's Rule. The reasoning
given was that neither the woman alone nor the taxpayers should suffer
because of an evening's pleasure. This was probably the same reason
used to overrule the standing requirement. Whatever the actual reason
was for the blending of the two rules the result achieved should be en-
couraged and supported, not simply because both rules are old and use-
less, but also because justice is more likely to be achieved by this
progressive application of both rules.
MARVIN KURZBAN
73. Id. at 120.
74. 159 Me. 241, 191 A.2d 104 (1963).
75. Id. at 249-50, 191 A.2d at 108.
76. See note 45 supra.
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